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Abstract. The paper presents a parallel between two important theo-
ries for the treatment of information which address questions that are
apparently unrelated and that are studied by different research communi-
ties: an enriched view of formal concept analysis and abstract argumenta-
tion. Both theories exploit a binary relation (expressing object-property
links, attacks between arguments). We show that when an argumenta-
tion framework rather considers the complementary relation does not
attack, then its stable extensions can be seen as the exact counterparts
of formal concepts. This leads to a cube of oppositions, a generalization
of the well-known square of oppositions, between eight remarkable sets
of arguments. This provides a richer view for argumentation in cases of
bi-valued attack relations and fuzzy ones.
Keywords: argumentation, formal concept analysis, possibility theory,
square of oppositions
1 Introduction
Formal concept analysis [34, 29] exploits a binary relation that links objects and
properties. This relation, called ‘formal context’, is usually a classical 2-valued
one (i.e., an object has, or not, a property), but may be also a fuzzy relation
[5–7] when properties may be a matter of degree. From this relation, the notion
of ‘formal concept’ is defined as maximal sets of pairs made of a subset of objects
and a subset of properties, such that each object in a subset has all the proper-
ties in the associated subsets, and the objects in a subset are the only ones to
have all these properties, in the considered context. Formal concepts are charac-
terized by a fixed-point equation through a Galois connection. A recent parallel
[18] with possibility theory [19] has shown the interest of introducing operators
in this setting other than the one underlying the notion of formal concept, which
leads to consider other connexions as well [15, 22].
In a fully independent way, an abstract theory of argumentation [24] has been
developed on the basis of a binary attack relation between arguments. This re-
lation, generally a classical one, may also become fuzzy when one tries to model
the strength of arguments [25]. The objective is then to determine noticeable
subsets of arguments that in particular constitute stable extensions in the sense
they are without internal conflict, and where each argument outside the exten-
sion is attacked by an argument of the extension.
The exploitation in each setting of a classical binary relation, which may be
more generally fuzzy, may lead to wonder about a possible parallel between the
two theories, and about their possible mutual enrichment. In the next section
we restate the formal elements of the abstract theory of argumentation and em-
phasize the different existing relational equations. Then in Section 3 in the same
spirit, we recall the basis of formal concept analysis enriched by the operators
induced by the parallel with possibility theory. In Section 4, we make a paral-
lel between the abstract theory of argumentation and formal concept analysis,
which especially sheds light on the parallel between stable extension and formal
concept. Section 5 provides an analysis in terms of opposition structures that
help to get an organized view of different subsets of remarkable arguments. The
concluding remarks briefly considers the case of fuzzy relations, and in particu-
lar suggests lines of research for extending abstract theory of argumentation to
situations where attacks are weighted.
2 Argumentation
P. M. Dung [24], in a famous article which has raised considerable interest, has
proposed to define an argumentation system as a pair (A,R) where A is a set
of arguments, and R (6= ∅) a binary relation over A, i.e., R ⊆ A×A. Given two
arguments a ∈ A and b ∈ A, (a, b) ∈ R, or equivalently aRb, then means that
a attacks b. An argumentation system (A,R) can then be seen as an oriented
graph, where arguments are its nodes, and where the elements of R are the ver-
tices. As can be seen the notion of argument, which intuitively corresponds in the
logical view (see, e.g., [31]) to a minimal consistent set of formulas that in a given
logical setting enable us to deduce a formula of interest, is here “abstractized”,
as well as the notion of attack (which amounts in practice to challenge a deduced
formula, either directly, or by challenging one of the formulas appearing in the
argument for establishing its conclusion). Dung’s framework has been often used
as a reference setting and as a starting point in many artificial intelligence works
in argumentation until now.
A subset S ⊆ A of arguments attacks an argument a
if ∃s ∈ S and sRa.
A subset S ⊆ A of arguments attacks a subset S′ ⊆ A
if ∃s ∈ S and ∃s′ ∈ S′ and sRs′.
A subset S of arguments is conflict free
if ∄(a, b) ∈ S × S such as aRb.
Given an argumentation system (A,R), a key question that naturally arises
is the definition of acceptable subsets of arguments; an acceptable subset of ar-
guments is called extension. Different forms of acceptability exist. A well-known
one is the notion of stable extension.
A subset S of arguments without conflict is a stable extension if and only if
∀a 6∈ S,∃s ∈ S and sRa.
In other words, a stable extension attacks all the arguments outside. Other forms
of acceptability use the notion of defense. An argument a ∈ A is defended by
a subset of arguments S if and only if for each argument b ∈ A that attacks a,
∃s ∈ S such that sRb. A conflict-free subset S of arguments is an admissible
extension if and only if each argument of S is defended by S. A stable extension
is admissible.
One can then introduce remarkable sets associated with an argument a, or
with a subset of arguments S in terms of attack or defense, which help to make
the definitions more precise and to establish some properties :
– the set of arguments attacking a
Ra = {s ∈ A|sRa};
– the set of arguments attacked by a
aR = {s ∈ A|aRs};
– the set of arguments attacked by S
R+(S) = {a ∈ A|S attacks a}
= {a ∈ A|∃s ∈ S, sRa}
= {a ∈ A|S ∩Ra 6= ∅};
– the set of arguments attacking S
R−(S) = {a ∈ A|a attacksS}
= {a ∈ A|∃s ∈ S, aRs}
= {a ∈ A|S ∩ aR 6= ∅};
– the set of arguments defended by S
Def(S) = {a ∈ A|S defends a}
= {a ∈ A|∀b ∈ A t.q. bRa,∃s ∈ S s.t. sRb}
= {a ∈ A|Ra ⊆ R+(S)}.
The set of arguments defended by S is indeed made of the arguments whose
attackers are attacked by S.
It can be checked that
– S is conflict-free if and only if [1]
S ⊆ R+(S),
where T = A \ T . Indeed, the arguments that S attacks are then in S
(R+(S) ⊆ S).
– S is a stable extension if and only if [24]
S = R+(S). (1)
This follows from above, and from the definition of stability that requires
S ⊆ R+(S). Note also that the set of arguments non attacked by S is equal
to
R+(S) = {a ∈ A|∀s ∈ S, sRa}, i.e., we have
R+(S) = {a ∈ A|S ⊆ Ra} (2)
where sRa means that s does not attack a. One can then establish that:
– Def(S) = R+(R+(S)) [1].
Indeed, applying Equation 2 one gets R+(R+(S)) = {a ∈ A|R+(S) ⊆ Ra},
which provides the proof since Ra = Ra, taking into account the definition
of Def(S).
Thus if S is a stable extension, Equation 1 holds, and then
Def(S) = S
In a stable extension, the arguments are thus defending themselves.
One can still establish that [8]
– S is an admissible extension if and only if
S ⊆ Def(S) ∩R+(S).
Indeed, this is equivalent to S ⊆ Def(S) ∧ S ⊆ R+(S), which indeed means
that the arguments in S are both defended by S and non attacked by S (S
is thus conflict-free). This condition can be still written
S ⊆ {a ∈ A|R+(S) ⊆ Ra ∧ S ⊆ Ra}
⇔ S ⊆ {a ∈ A|(R+(S) ∪ S) ⊆ Ra}
⇔ S ⊆ {a ∈ A|Ra ⊆ (R+(S) ∩ S)}.
– S is an admissible extension if and only if
S ⊆ Def(S ∩R−(S)).
Indeed, this condition guarantees that S is conflict-free, since it expresses
that each argument in S is defended by an argument in S that does not attack
S (we have R−(S) = {a ∈ A|S ⊆ aR}). Indeed, if aRb with (a, b) ∈ S2, b
cannot be defended by c (i.e. cRa and thus c ∈ R−(S)) with c ∈ R−(S).
– An admissible extension S is said complete if and only if each argument
which is defended by S is in S [24]. Thus S is complete if and only if S is
admissible and Def(S) ⊆ S. Thus, we have
S is a complete extension if and only if
S = Def(S) ∩R+(S).
Moreover, if S is a complete extension, then
S = Def(S).
3 Formal concept analysis
Formal concept analysis (FCA) [4, 34] provides a theoretical setting for the learn-
ing of hierarchies of concepts (from which association rules can be extracted). It
starts with a formal context K = (O,P,R) where R is a binary relation com-
pletely defined between a set of objects O and a set of Boolean properties P.
Namely, R ⊆ O × P. A formal context is often visualized under the form of a
table such that the presence of a cross (×) (resp. its absence) in a cell indicates
if an objet satisfies (resp. does not satisfy) the corresponding property.
Given an object x and a property y, let R(x) = {y ∈ P | xRy} be the set
of properties satisfied by object x (xRy means that x has property y) and let
R(y) = {x ∈ O | xRy} be the set of objects having property y. In FCA, one
defines correspondences between the sets 2O and 2P . These correspondences are
called Galois derivation operators. The Galois operator, which is at the basis of
FCA, here denoted (.)∆ (for reasons made clear later), enables us to express the
set of properties satisfied by all the objects in X ⊆ O as :
X∆ = {y ∈ P | ∀x ∈ O (x ∈ X ⇒ xRy)}
= {y ∈ P | X ⊆ R(y)} =
⋂
x∈X R(x)
We can also express, in a dual manner, the set of objects satisfying all the
properties in Y as :
Y ∆ = {x ∈ O | ∀y ∈ P (y ∈ Y ⇒ xRy)}
= {x ∈ O | Y ⊆ R(x)} =
⋂
y∈Y R(y)
The dual pair of operators ((.)∆, (.)∆) applied respectively to 2O and to 2P
constitutes a Galois connexion that enables the definition of formal concepts.
Aformal concept is a pair (X,Y ) such as
X∆ = Y and Y ∆ = X.
In other words, X is the maximal set of objects satisfying all the properties
already satisfied by all the objects in X. The set X (resp. Y ) is called extension
(resp. intension) of the concept. It can be shown that in an equivalent way,
(X,Y ) is a formal concept if and only if it is a maximal pair in the sense of set
inclusion such as
X × Y ⊆ R.
The set of all the formal concepts is naturally equipped with an order relation
(denoted 4) and defined as : (X1, Y1)  (X2, Y2) iff X1 ⊆ X2 (or Y2 ⊆ Y1).
This set equipped with the order relation 4 forms a complete lattice B(K). The
operators meet and join in the lattice are described by the fundamental result
due to Ganter and Wille [29] :
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In [18], on the basis of a parallel with possibility theory (indeed X∆ =⋂
x∈X R(x) may be seen as the counterpart of the definition of a guaranteed
possibility measure ∆(F ) = minx∈F pi(x) where pi is a possibility distribution),
other operators have been introduced: namely the possibility operator (denoted
(.)Π) and its dual, the necessity operator (denoted (.)N ), as well as the operator
(.)∇, dual of the operator (.)△ at the basis of FCA, defined as follows:
– XΠ is the set of properties satisfied by at least one object in X:
XΠ = {y ∈ P | ∃x ∈ X, xRy}
= {y ∈ P | X ∩R(y) 6= ∅}
=
⋃
x∈X R(x)
– XN is the set of properties that only the objects in X have:
XN = {y ∈ P | ∀x ∈ O (xRy ⇒ x ∈ X)}
= {y ∈ P | R(y) ⊆ X}
=
⋂
x6∈X R(x)
(where R(x) is the set of properties that x does not have)
– X∇ is the set of properties that are not satisfied by at least one object
outside X (X∇ should not be confused with the notion of weak opposition
in FCA, often denoted in a similar way):
X∇ = {y ∈ P | ∃x ∈ X, xRy}
= {y ∈ P|R(y) ∪X 6= O}
=
⋃
x6∈X R(x)
The operators Y Π , Y N , Y ∇ are obtained in a dual manner. As established
in [15, 22], the pairs (X,Y ) such as XN = Y and Y N = X (or in an equivalent
way XΠ = Y and Y Π = X) characterize independent sub-contexts (i.e. which
have not any objects or properties in common) inside the initial context. The
pairs (X,Y ) such as XN = Y and Y N = X are such that:
(X × Y ) ∪ (X × Y ) ⊇ R.
Regarding X∇ = Y and Y ∇ = X, it constitutes another characterization of
formal concepts.
It has been shown [18, 22] that the four sets XΠ , XN , X∆, X∇ represent
complementary pieces of information, which are all necessary for a complete
analysis of the situation of a set X in the formal context K = (O,P,R).
4 Stable extensions in argumentation and formal concepts
There is a striking parallel between Equation 2 in Section 2
R+(S) = {a ∈ A|S ⊆ Ra}
and the expression
X∆ = {y ∈ P | X ⊆ R(y)} =
⋂
x∈X
R(x)
as well as between the definition 1 of a stable extension S
S = R+(S)
and the one of a formal concept (X,Y )
X∆ = Y and Y ∆ = X,
taking into account the similarity of the definitions of R+(S) and X∆.
However, there is an obvious difference: in argumentation one is in the par-
ticular case O = P = A. What plays the role of the formal context is thus the
relation R (“does not attack”) defined on A×A = O ×P.
It is well-known that stable extensions do not always exist. For instance,
(A = {a, b, c, d}, R = {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}) has no stable extension. While formal
concepts always exist when R 6= ∅, here it is no longer the case, when we work
on A×A, rather than with O×P where O 6= P. Since here the only acceptable
formal concepts (X,Y ) should be such that X = Y (= S in the above notation).
Then, one can look at the argumentative counterparts of XΠ , XN , or X∇.
They are respectively:
– R
+
(S) = {a ∈ A|S ∩Ra 6= ∅}
the set of arguments not attacked by all the arguments in S. It means that for
each argument in R
+
(S) there exists at least one argument in S that does not
attack it. It should not be confused with the set of arguments not attacked by
some arguments in S: R+(S) = {a ∈ A|S ∩ Ra = ∅}; Thus we have R+(S) ⊆
R
+
(S), just as ∆ ≤ Π in possibility theory.
– R
+
(S)={a∈A|Ra ⊆ S}={a∈A|S ⊆ Ra}
the set of arguments that are attacked by all the arguments outside S ;
– R+(S) = {a ∈ A|S ∪Ra 6= A}
= {a ∈ A|S ∩Ra 6= ∅}
the set of arguments that are attacked by arguments outside S. We have R
+
(S) ⊆
R+(S), as well as N ≤ ∇ holds in possibility theory. Moreover, if R 6= ∅ and
R 6= ∅, we have R
+
(S) ⊆ R
+
(S) and R+(S) ⊆ R+(S), counterparts of N ≤ Π
and ∆ ≤ ∇ respectively. Thus, finally it holds that
R+(S) ∪R
+
(S) ⊆ R+(S) ∩R
+
(S).
If one leaves aside complementations, it can thus be seen that given S, there
are four basic sets of arguments:
R+(S), R
+
(S), R+(S), R
+
(S).
They are i) the arguments attacked by S, ii) the arguments not attacked by
S, iii) the arguments attacked by non S, iv)the arguments not attacked by non
S. Considering these four sets is necessary for a complete characterization of the
relative position of the set of attackers of an argument a with respect to a set S
of arguments (see [22] for the detailed possibilistic counterpart of this fact). It
is clear that in a dual manner, there are four other noticeable sets in terms of
R− rather than of R+.
We are thus led to consider the counterparts of the four conditions X∆ = Y
and Y ∆ = X, X∇ = Y and Y ∇ = X, XΠ = Y and Y Π = X, and XN = Y
and Y N = X. They are respectively S = R+(S), S = R+(S), which equivalently
characterizes a stable extension on the one hand, and the equivalent constraints
S = R
+
(S) and S = R
+
(S) on the other hand, which correspond to extensions
S and S that present a form of independence. Indeed S = R
+
(S)⇔ S = R
+
(S)
expresses that the set of arguments that are attacked by all the arguments outside
S are precisely the arguments outside S.
5 Structures of opposition and abstract argumentation
Structures of opposition have been studied in logic for a long time. In particular,
the square of oppositions invented by Aristotle and its modern generalization
to an hexagon of oppositions after the works of Robert Blanche´ [11] and Be´ziau
[10] are encountered each time an internal negation and an external negation are
at work on formal expressions.
Taking advantage of results presented in [23] regarding the structures of op-
positions in formal concept analysis and in possibility theory, one may study in
a similar manner the structures of oppositions at work in the theory of abstract
argumentation, and in particular obtain the cube of oppositions pictured in Fig-
ure 1, where the four sets of arguments and their complements appear (a set
and its complement are at the two extremities of diagonals). The vertical arrows
express inclusions. For example R+(S) ⊆ R+(S) (provided that R 6= ∅).
i: R+(S)
I: R
+
(S) O: R
+
(S)
o: R+(S)
a: R+(S)
A: R
+
(S) E: R
+
(S)
e: R+(S)
Fig. 1. Cube of oppositions between 8 remarkable sets of arguments
It is worth noticing that the different meaningful sets of arguments can be
organized in such a structure that has played an important role through the
whole history of logic. Moreover, the hexagonal structure of oppositions obtained
in the logic of argumentation proposed in [3] should also be compared to the one
obtained here.
6 Concluding remarks: The gradual case
The idea to extend FCA to a fuzzy formal context, which enables us to express
that an object satisfies a property to an intermediary degree, has been initially
proposed by Burusco and Fuentes-Gonzalez [12] before being considerably devel-
oped by Belohlavek [5–7], and by a number of other authors, as in particular [30,
26, 32, 33]. For a discussion of different meaningful gradual extensions of FCA,
the reader is referred to [14, 16].
We only give here the basic operator of fuzzy FCA [6]:
X∆(y) =
∧
x∈O
(X(x)→ R(x, y))
where now R is a fuzzy relation, R(x, y) is the degree to which x is in relation R
with y, andX andX∆ are fuzzy sets of objects and properties respectively, and
∧
is the conjunction operator min and→ an implication operator. An appropriate
choice of this connective (such as Go¨del residuated implication: a → b = 1 if
a ≤ b, and a→ b = b if a > b) enables us to see a fuzzy formal concept in terms
of its level cuts Xα, Yα in such a way that
(Xα × Yα) ⊆ Rα
where Xα × Yα is maximal, with Rα = {(x, y)|R(x, y) ≥ α}, Xα = {x ∈
O|X(x) ≥ α}, Yα = {y ∈ P|Y (y) ≥ α}.
The idea of an abstract argumentation theory allowing for a graded attack
relation has been recently advocated by some authors, in particularly in [25].
Following the parallel presented here, we are thus led to characterize a fuzzy
stable extension by the equation
S(s) =
∧
a∈A
(S(s)→ R(s, a))
where S(s) is the degree to which the argument s belongs to the fuzzy stable
extension S, R(s, a) = 1−R(s, a), R(s, a) being the degree with which s attacks
a, which generalizes S = R+(S) = {a ∈ A|S ⊆ Ra}.
By exploiting the counterpart of(Xα × Yα) ⊆ Rα, in the argumentative set-
ting, one sees that we are back to the study of the level cuts of the relation of
“non-attack” R.
In the same spirit, one could define fuzzy admissible extensions, or define
fuzzy extensions of R
+
(S), R+(S), and R
+
(S).
The association of degrees to arguments may have different meanings: They
may in particular reflect the strength of the argument, or the uncertainty as-
sociated to its components. The nature of the degrees is as much important in
FCA, since uncertainty and satisfaction level of a gradual property should not be
handled in the same way [16]. Different treatments should as well be considered
in argumentation according to the meaning of the degrees. What is suggested
above rather applies to the strength of the arguments rather than to their un-
certainty.
The computation of extensions in argumentation can be expressed in the set-
ting of propositional logic in terms of algebraic equations as shown in [9] (see also
[2]). This idea has been recently reused by Gabbay [28], thus putting abstract
argumentation in the framework of the equational semantics of propositional
logic, first developed one century ago by Louis Couturat [13]. The exploitation
of this idea can be extended to fuzzy logic [28]. One can thus also reconsider
what is proposed above in this paper in that perspective.
This paper is a preliminary attempt at bridging four noticeable areas in
the formal treatment of information, namely abstract argumentation, formal
concept analysis, but also possibility theory and squares of opposition, which
have remained completely related until recently. Such parallels should contribute
to enrich each domain: for instance, in argumentation by considering new sets of
arguments and understanding better how they are related. It may also provide
useful guidelines for introducing grades in argumentation.
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